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


















The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company "EGAS"

# **Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Study For Al-Waqf Pressure Reduction Station**





Prepared By  
Petroleum Safety and Environmental Services Company  
**PETROSAFE**

**November 2018**

Prepared By: <b>PETROSAFE</b>		 <b>Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company "EGAS"</b>	<b>Page 1 of 112</b>												
			<b>Date: Nov. 2018</b>												
<b>Document Title: Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Study For Al-Waqf Pressure Reduction &amp; Metering Station</b>															
<b>Title</b>	Quantitative Risk Assessment Study For Al-Waqf New Pressure Reduction Station – Qena Governorate														
<b>Customer</b>	Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company "EGAS"														
<b>Customer Reference</b>	EGAS/QRA/02/2015-MG/MS														
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<b>Report Status</b>	Revision 0														
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<b>Team Work</b>	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Name</th> <th>Signature</th> <th>Date</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Eng. Mahmoud Nada Audit. &amp; Insp. Section Head</td> <td> PETROSAFE</td> <td>29/10/2018</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Chem. Mohamad Samy Loss Prev. &amp; Cont. Dept. Head</td> <td> PETROSAFE</td> <td>01/11/2018</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Geo. Mohamad Al-Ghazaly Saf. &amp; Env. Affairs Gen. Mgr.</td> <td> PETROSAFE</td> <td>05/11/2018</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Name	Signature	Date	Eng. Mahmoud Nada Audit. & Insp. Section Head	 PETROSAFE	29/10/2018	Chem. Mohamad Samy Loss Prev. & Cont. Dept. Head	 PETROSAFE	01/11/2018	Geo. Mohamad Al-Ghazaly Saf. & Env. Affairs Gen. Mgr.	 PETROSAFE	05/11/2018		
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## Executive Summary

This report summarizes the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) analysis study undertaken for the New Natural Gas Pressure Reduction & Metering Station "PRMS" with Odorant at AlWaqf City – Qena Governorate – Egypt. The PRMS owned by The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company "EGAS" and operated by Regional Gas Company "ReGas".

The scope of work includes performing frequency assessment, consequence modeling analysis and Quantitative Risk Assessment of AlWaqf PRMS in order to assess its impacts on the surroundings.

The main objective of the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study is to demonstrate that Individual Risk "IR" for workers and for public fall within the ALARP region of Risk Acceptance Criteria, and the new AlWaqf PRMS does not lead to any unacceptable risks to workers or the public.

QRA Study has been undertaken in accordance with the methodology outlined in the UKHSE as well as international regulations and standards.

QRA starts by Hazard Identification (HAZID) study, which determines the Major Accident Hazards (MAH) that requires consequence modelling, frequency analysis, and risk calculation.

In order to perform consequence-modelling analysis of the potential hazardous scenarios resulting from loss of containment, some assumptions and design basis have been proposed. Three scenarios of the release have been proposed:

1. Gas Release from the inlet / outlet pipeline.
2. Gas Release from the off-take point.
3. Leak from odorant tank.

The QRA has been performed using DNV Phast software (Ver. 7.21) for consequence modelling of different types of hazardous consequences.

Weather conditions have been selected based on wind speed and stability class for the area detailed weather statistics.

The worst case weather conditions has been selected represented by wind speed of 3.2 m/s and stability class "D" representing "Neutral" weather conditions, in order to obtain conservative results. The prevailing wind direction is North West (NW) & West North West (WNW).



As per results from modeling the consequences of each scenario, the following table summarize the study, and as follows:

Event	Scenario	Effects
<b>Pin hole (1") gas release 4" inlet pipeline</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 4 &amp; 9.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> will be limited inside the PRMS boundary. The values of 12.5, 25 &amp; 37,5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> not determined by the software due to small amount of the gas released.</i>
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
<b>Half Rupture (2") gas release 4" inlet pipeline</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud (50 % LFL) will extend to be near to the admin office downwind.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<i>The modeling shows that the values of 9.5 &amp; 12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> will effects the firefighting facilities crosswind northeast side.</i>
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will cover the admin room (downwind) and firefighting facility (crosswind) and extend outside the PRMS boundary from the east and west sides not reaching surrounds. The values of 0.137 and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and near to the admin office and firefighting facilities.</i>

Event	Scenario	Effects
<b>Full Rupture gas release 4" inlet pipeline</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<p>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects (LFL &amp; 50 % LFL) will extend to reach the admin office and over SE boundary reaching a distance of about 13 m from the east fence downwind near to the public building boundary.</p> <p>The UFL and LFL will reach the admin office downwind.</p>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<p>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values 9.5, 12.5 &amp; 25 kW/m<sup>2</sup> will cover the admin office downwind and firefighting facilities crosswind, and with some extension (9.5 &amp; 12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup>) outside with no effects.</p>
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<p>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020, 0.137 &amp; 0.206 bar will extend outside the PRMS boundary from southeast side covering the public house and the external road, with no effects inside the PRMS (0.137 &amp; 0.206 bar).</p>
	Heat radiation / Fireball 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	N/D
<b>Pin hole (1") gas release 8" outlet pipeline</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<p>The modeling shows that the gas cloud will be limited inside the PRMS boundary.</p>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<p>The modeling shows that the heat radiation value 1.6, 4 &amp; 9.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary downwind with no effects of 12.5, 25 &amp; 37.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup>, which not determined by the software.</p>

Event	Scenario	Effects
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<p><i>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will cover the PRMS components and extend outside the boundary from all sides near to the public houses (down and crosswind).</i></p> <p><i>The values of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS boundary affecting the PRMS facilities and reaching the firefighting facilities crosswind.</i></p>
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D

#### Half Rupture (4") gas release 8" outlet pipeline

	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<p><i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud (UFL, LFL &amp; 50% LFL) will limited inside the PRMS boundary and will be near to the admin office.</i></p>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<p><i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 &amp; 37.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> will be limited inside the PRMS boundary affecting the admin office.</i></p>
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<p><i>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will cover the PRMS components and extend outside the boundary from all sides near to the public houses (down and crosswind).</i></p> <p><i>The values of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS boundary affecting the PRMS facilities and reaching the firefighting facilities crosswind.</i></p>
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<p><i>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend PRMS boundary covering the PRMS components inside and outside from southeast side reaching the public building.</i></p> <p><i>The value of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS extend to the southeast behind the admin office.</i></p>

Event	Scenario	Effects
<b>Full Rupture gas release 8" outlet pipeline</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and near to the admin office downwind.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<i>The modeling shows that all radiation values will affects the admin office and extend outside the PRMS from southeast side near to the public building (9 &amp; 12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup>) downwind.</i>
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will cover the PRMS c and extend outside the boundary from all sides near to the public houses (down and crosswind). The values of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS boundary affecting the PRMS facilities and reaching the firefighting facilities crosswind.</i>
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend PRMS boundary covering the PRMS components inside and outside from southeast side reaching the public building. The value of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will extend outside the PRMS from the southeast side with no effects on the public building downwind.</i>
	Heat radiation / Fireball 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 9.5 &amp; 12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and near to the firefighting facilities crosswind.</i>
<b>Odorant tank 1" leak</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the vapor cloud will be limited inside the PRMS boundary reaching the admin office downwind. Consideration should be taken when deal with liquid, vapors and smokes according to the MSDS for the material.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation will be limited inside the PRMS boundary with some extension outside from southwest side with no effects.</i>

Event	Scenario	Effects
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	The modeling shows that all values will be limited inside the PRMS boundary effecting the admin office downwind.
<b>Pin hole (1") gas release 4" off-take pipeline</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the off-take boundary.
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 1.6 kW/m <sup>2</sup> will be limited inside the off-take boundary with some extension outside downwind with no effects. The values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> not determined by the software as it is very small values.
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
<b>Half Rupture (2") gas release 4" off-take pipeline</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the off-take boundary.
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 1.6 will extend outside the off-take boundary from south, east and west sides with a few meters. The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of & 4 kW/m <sup>2</sup> will extend outside the off-take boundary downwind with no effects. The values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> not determined by the software as it is very small values.



Event	Scenario	Effects
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
<b>Full Rupture gas release 4" off-take pipeline</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud will be limited inside the off-take boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values will extend outside the off-take boundary from southeast side downwind with about 50 m covering the outside subway.</i>
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
	Heat radiation / Fireball 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	N/D

The previous table shows that there are some of potential hazards with heat radiation (12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup>) resulting from jet fire and explosion overpressure waves (0.137 bar) from late explosion events.

These risks (Jet fire & Explosion overpressure waves) will affects the workers at the PRMS, and reach the public around the station (public building). In addition, it was noted that there is some effects from off-take point on surrounding area (public road) from heat radiation effects.

Regarding to risk calculations; the risk to **Workers found in Low ALARP, the Public (PRMS) and Off-Take in Acceptable Region**, so there are some points need to be considered to keep the risk tolerability and this will be describe in the study recommendations.

The major hazards that extend over site boundary and/or effect on workers / public were used for Risk Calculations.

Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is an analysis technique for identifying and evaluating the sequence of events in a potential accident scenario following the occurrence of an initiating event. ETA utilizes a visual logic tree structure known as an event tree (ET). ETA provides a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the risk associated with each potential outcome. ETA has been used for scenario development.

The following data and assumptions have been considered in the Event tree analysis (ETA):

- Failure frequency data (mainly E&P Forum/OGP),
- Risk reduction factors (if available),
- Ignition probabilities (both immediate and delayed),
- Vulnerability data.

Risks have been assessed for workers / public using International Risk Management Guidelines as a reference.

The resulting risks have been compared with International Risk Acceptance Criteria.

Risk evaluation for Individual Risk "IR" for the major hazards presented in the following tables:

***Individual Risk (IR) Calculation for the Off-Take Public***

Scenario	Event	People	Individual Risk "IR"	Acceptability Criteria
Gas Release from 8" off-take point	Jet Fire	Outdoor	<b><i>4.58E-09</i></b>	Acceptable (✓)
<b>TOTAL Risk for the Public (Off-Take)</b>			<b><i>4.58E-09</i></b>	Acceptable (✓)


**Individual Risk (IR) Calculation for the PRMS Workers**

Scenario	Event	People	Individual Risk "IR"	Acceptability Criteria
Gas Release from 2"/4" inlet pipeline	Explosion	Indoor	<b>8.76E-06</b>	Acceptable (✓)
Gas Release from 4" inlet pipeline	Jet Fire	Indoor	<b>6.54E-08</b>	Acceptable (✓)
Gas Release from 4"/8" outlet pipeline	Jet Fire	Indoor	<b>2.92E-06</b>	Acceptable (✓)
	Explosion	Indoor	<b>8.76E-06</b>	Acceptable (✓)
Gas Release from 8" outlet pipeline	Jet Fire	Indoor	<b>1.29E-07</b>	Acceptable (✓)
Odorant tank 1" leak	Explosion	Indoor	<b>6.78E-06</b>	Acceptable (✓)
<b>TOTAL Risk for the Workers (PRMS)</b>			<b>2.74E-05</b>	<b>ALARP</b>

**Individual Risk (IR) Calculation for the Public Near to the PRMS**

Scenario	Event	People	Individual Risk "IR"	Acceptability Criteria
Gas Release from 8" off-take point	Explosion	Indoor	<b>2.45E-07</b>	Acceptable (✓)
<b>TOTAL Risk for the Public (PRMS)</b>			<b>2.45E-07</b>	<b>Acceptable (✓)</b>

The following figure show the Individual Risk "IR" as well as Societal Risk "SR" for AlWaqf PRMS and Off-Take point:



## Introduction

The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company “EGAS” has engaged Petroleum Safety and Environmental Services Company “PETROSAFE” to identify and evaluate hazards generated from the “New Natural Gas Pressure Reduction and Odorant Station – PRMS” at AlWaqf City – Qena Governorate – Egypt. The PRMS operated by Regional Gas Company “ReGas” in order to advice protective measures for minimizing risk up to acceptable level.

As part of this review, a QRA study conducted for the following objectives:

- Identify hazardous scenarios related to the most critical unexpected event(s).
- Determine the likelihood of the identified scenarios;
- Model the potential consequences of the identified scenarios;
- Determine the Potential risk of fatality resulting from the identified hazardous scenarios.

The proposed study should also identify existing arrangements for the prevention of major accidents and their mitigation. This would involve emergency plan and procedure for dealing with such events.

PETROSAFE selected to carry out this study, as it has the experience in conducting this type of work.

PETROSAFE is also empowered by the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation “EGPC” to identify and evaluate factors that relate to Occupational Health & Safety and Environmental Protection.



## Technical Definitions

ALARP	<i>Stands for "As Low As Reasonably Practicable", and is a term often used in the milieu of safety-critical and safety-involved systems. The ALARP principle is that the residual risk shall be as low as reasonably practicable.</i>
API	<i>American Petroleum Institute.</i>
Confinement	<i>A qualitative or quantitative measure of the enclosure or partial enclosure areas where vapors cloud may be contained.</i>
Congestion	<i>A qualitative or quantitative measure of the physical layout, spacing, and obstructions within a facility that promote development of a vapor cloud explosion.</i>
DNV PHAST	<i>Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool "PHAST" established by Det Norske Veritas "DNV". Phast examines the progress of a potential incident from the initial release to far-field dispersion including modelling of pool spreading and evaporation, and flammable and toxic effects.</i>
E&P Forum	<i>Exploration and Production "E&amp;P" Forum is the international association of oil companies and petroleum industry organizations formed in 1974. It was established to represent its members' interests at the specialized agencies of the United Nations, governmental and other international bodies concerned with regulating the exploration and production of oil and gas.</i>
EGAS	<i>The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company.</i>
EGPC	<i>The Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation.</i>
EX	<i>Explosion Proof Type Equipment.</i>
EERA	<i>Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment.</i>
ESD	<i>Emergency Shut Down.</i>
Explosion	<i>Explosion is the delayed ignition of gas in a confined or congested area resulting in high overpressure waves. Once the explosion occurs, it creates a blast wave that has a very steep pressure rise at the wave front and a blast wind that is a</i>

	<p><i>transient flow behind the blast wave. The impact of the blast wave on structure near the explosion known as blast loading. The two important aspects of the blast loading concern are the prediction of the magnitude of the blast and of the pressure loading onto the local structures. Pressure loading predication as result of a blast; resemble a pulse of trapezoidal or triangular shape. They normally have duration of between approximately 40 msec and 400 msec. The time to maximum pressure is typically 20 msec.</i></p> <p><i>Primary damage from an explosion may result from several events:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>1. Overpressure - the pressure developed between the expanding gas and its surrounding atmosphere.</i></li> <li><i>2. Pulse - the differential pressure across a plant as a pressure wave passes might cause collapse or movement, both positive and negative.</i></li> <li><i>3. Missiles and Shrapnel - are whole or partial items that are thrown by the blast of expanding gases that might cause damage or event escalation. In general, these "missiles" from atmospheric vapor cloud explosions cause minor impacts to process equipment since insufficient energy is available to lift heavy objects and cause major impacts. Small projectile objects are still a hazard to personnel and may cause injuries and fatalities. Impacts from rupture incidents may produce catastrophic results.</i></li> </ol>
(ETA) Event Tree Analysis	<p><i>Is a forward, bottom up, logical modeling technique for both success and failure that explores responses through a single initiating event and lays a path for assessing probabilities of the outcomes and overall system analysis. This analysis technique used to analyze the effects of functioning or failed systems, given that an event has occurred.</i></p>
Failure Rate	<p><i>Is the frequency with which an engineered system or component fails, expressed in failures per unit of time. It is highly used in reliability engineering.</i></p>
GASCO	<p><i>The Egyptian Natural Gas Company.</i></p>
Gas Cloud Dispersion	<p><i>Gas cloud air dilution naturally reduces the concentration to below the LEL or no longer considered ignitable (typically defined as 50 % of the LEL).</i></p>

HSE Policy	<i>Health, Safety and Environmental Policy.</i>
Hazard	<i>An inherent physical or chemical characteristic (flammability, toxicity, corrosively, stored chemical or mechanical energy) or set of conditions that has the potential for causing harm to people, property, or the environment.</i>
(HAZOP) Hazard And Operability Study	<i>Is a structured and systematic examination of a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation. The HAZOP technique is qualitative, and aims to stimulate the imagination of participants to identify potential hazards and operability problems; structure and completeness given by using guideword prompts.</i>
(HAZID) Hazard Identification Study	<i>Is a tool for hazard identification, used early in a project as soon as process flow diagrams, draft heat and mass balances, and plot layouts are available. Existing site infrastructure, weather, and Geotechnical data also required, these being a source of external hazards.</i>
(HAC) Hazardous Area Classification	<i>When electrical equipment is used in, around, or near an atmosphere that has flammable gases or vapors, flammable liquids, combustible dusts, ignitable fibers or flying's, there is always a possibility or risk that a fire or explosion might occur. Those areas where the possibility or risk of fire or explosion might occur due to an explosive atmosphere and/or mixture is often called a hazardous (or classified) location/area.</i>
(IR) Individual Risk	<i>The risk to a single person inside a particular building. Maximum individual risk is the risk to the most-exposed person and assumes that the person is exposed.</i>
Jet Fire	<i>A jet fire is a pressurized stream of combustible gas or atomized liquid (such as a high-pressure release from a gas pipe or wellhead blowout event) that is burning. If such a release is ignited soon after it occurs, (i.e., within 2 - 3 minutes), the result is an intense jet flame. This jet fire stabilizes to a point that is close to the source of release, until the release stopped. A jet fire is usually a very localized, but very destructive to anything close to it. This is partly because as well as producing thermal radiation, the jet fire causes considerable convective heating in the region</i>

	<p>beyond the tip of the flame. The high velocity of the escaping gas entrains air into the gas "jet" causing more efficient combustion to occur than in pool fires.</p> <p>Consequently, a much higher heat transfer rate occurs to any object immersed in the flame, i.e., over 200 kW/m<sup>2</sup> (62,500 Bt/sq. ft) for a jet fire than in a pool fire flame. Typically, the first 10% of a jet fire length is conservatively considered un-ignited gas, as a result of the exit velocity causing the flame to lift off the gas point of release. This effect has been measured on hydrocarbon facility flares at 20% of the jet length, but a value of 10% is used to account for the extra turbulence around the edges of a real release point as compared to the smooth gas release from a flare tip. Jet flames have a relatively cool core near the source. The greatest heat flux usually occurs at impingement distances beyond 40% of the flame length, from its source. The greatest heat flux is not necessarily on the directly impinged side.</p>
kW/m <sup>2</sup>	Kilowatt per square meter – unit for measuring the heat radiation (or heat flux).
LFL / LEL	Lower Flammable Limit / Lower Explosive Limit - The lowest concentration (percentage) of a gas or a vapor in air capable of producing a flash of fire in presence of an ignition source.
MSDS	Material Safety Data Sheet.
mm Hg	A millimeter of mercury is a manometric unit of pressure, formerly defined as the extra pressure generated by a column of mercury one millimeter high.
MEL	Maximum Exposure Limit.
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association.
N	North Direction.
NE	Northern East Direction.
NW	Northern West Direction.
N/D	Not Determined.

N/R	<i>Not Reached.</i>
OGP	<i>Oil and Gas Producers.</i>
ppm	<i>Part Per Million.</i>
PRMS	<i>Pressure Reduction and Metering Station.</i>
P&ID's	<i>Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams.</i>
PETROSAFE	<i>Petroleum Safety and Environmental Services Company.</i>
QRA	<i>Quantitative Risk Assessment Study is a formal and systematic approach to estimating the likelihood and consequences of hazardous events, and expressing the results quantitatively as risk to people, the environment or your business.</i>
ReGas	<i>Regional Gas Company.</i>
Risk	<i>Relates to the probability of exposure to a hazard, which could result in harm to personnel, the environment or public. Risk is a measure of potential for human injury or economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the injury / loss.</i>
Risk Assessment	<i>The identification and analysis, either qualitative or quantitative, of the likelihood and outcome of specific events or scenarios with judgments of probability and consequences.</i>
scm/hr	<i>Standard Cubic Meter Per Hour.</i>
SCBA	<i>Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus.</i>
SE	<i>Southern East Direction.</i>
SW	<i>Southern West Direction.</i>
TWA	<i>Time Weighted Averages.</i>
UFL/UEL	<i>Upper flammable limit, the flammability limit describing the richest flammable mixture of a combustible gas.</i>
UVCE	<i>When a flammable vapor is released, its mixture with air will form a flammable vapor cloud. If ignited, the flame speed may accelerate to high velocities and produce significant blast overpressure.</i>
V	<i>Volume.</i>
Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)	<i>An explosion in air of a flammable material cloud.</i>



## Objectives

The objectives of this QRA for the unit facilities are:

- Identify hazardous scenarios related to the facilities based on historical data recorded;
- Determine the likelihood (frequencies) of the identified scenarios;
- Model the potential consequences of the identified scenarios;
- Determine the Potential risk of fatality resulting from the identified hazardous scenarios;
- Evaluate the risk against the acceptable risk level to ensure that it is within As Low As Reasonably Practicable "ALARP", otherwise additional control measures and recommendations will be provided at this study to reduce the Risk, (ALARP).

## Quantitative Risk Assessment Study Scope

The scope of work of this QRA study is limited to the following:

- Identification of the Most Critical Event(s) or scenarios that may lead to fatal accidents as well as to ensure that the expected risk will not exceed the Acceptable Risk Level as per national and international standards;
- To assess and quantify the risks associated with AlWaqf PRMS and the off-take point on the neighboring / surrounding community;
- The study determines Frequencies, Consequences (Including Associated Effect Contours) and Potential Risk of Fatality for the identified hazardous scenarios;
- Normal operation of the facilities (e.g. Construction and specific maintenance activities) are excluded from this analysis.

## Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Studies

### Method of Assessment

#### 1.0- General Method Used

Attention mainly focussed on those accidents where a gross failure of containment could result in the generation of a large vapour cloud of flammable or toxic material. The approach adopted has involved the following stages:

- Identification of hazardous materials,
- Establishment of maximum total inventories and location.

During the site visit by the study team, the overall functioning of the site discussed in some detail and the Companies asked to provide a complete list of holdings of hazardous materials. A preliminary survey notes was issued by the team, as a private communication to the company concerned, and this formed the basis for subsequent more discussion and analysis.

From the PRMS design model provided by the client, it was impractical to examine in depth all possible failure modes for all parts within the time allowed for this study. Instead, only those potential failures, which might contribute, either directly or indirectly, to off-site risks were examined.


#### 2.0- Risk Assessment

As the PRMS designed and prepared for construction, so it was therefore necessary for the study team to identify and analyse the hazards potential from first principles the routes by which a single or multiple accident could affect the community or neighbouring.

The terms of reference required the team to investigate and determine the overall risk to health and safety both from individual installations and then foreseeable interactions.

The assessment of risk in a complex situation is difficult. No method is perfect as all have advantages and limitations.

It was agreed that the quantitative approach was the most meaningful way of comparing and evaluating different risks. The risk assessment framework shown in Figure (1) used for the study.



**Figure (1) Risk Assessment Framework**

## Modeling the Consequences

Modeling of the consequences is one of the key steps in Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA", as it provides the link between hazard identification (in this study Potential Loss of Containment Incidents) and the determination of possible impact of those incidents on People (Worker / Public), Asset and the Environment.

In this study, Natural Gas (Mainly Methane  $\text{CH}_4$ ) was considered. There are several types of consequences to be considered for modelling, these include Gas Dispersion (UFL - LFL - 50 % LFL) / Heat Radiation / Explosion Overpressure modeling, also each of these scenarios described in the following table:

***Table (1) Description of Modeling of the Different Scenario***

<b><i>Discharge Modeling</i></b>	<i>Modeling of the mass release rate and its variation overtime.</i>
<b><i>Radiation Modeling</i></b>	<i>Modeling of the Thermal radiation from fires.</i>
<b><i>Dispersion Modeling</i></b>	<i>Modeling of the Gas and two-phase releases.</i>
<b><i>Overpressure</i></b>	<i>Associated with explosions or pressure burst.</i>

Toxic hazards are considered as result of releases / loss of containment for which discharge modeling and gas dispersion modeling are required. The hazard ranges are dependent upon the condition of the release pressure and rate of release.

There are a number of commercial software for modeling gas dispersion, fire, explosion and toxic releases. PETROSAFE select the DNV PHAST Ver. 7.21 Software package in modeling scenarios.

The software developed by DNV in order to provide a standard and validated set of consequence models that can be used to predict the effects of a release of hydrocarbon or chemical liquid or vapour. (Results of the modeling presented in pages from 50 to 90)

## Criterion for Risk Tolerability

The main function of this phase of the work was to assess the effectiveness of the proposed arrangement for managing risks against performance standards.

In order to do this, we need firstly to define a performance standard and secondly, to be able to analyse the effectiveness of the arrangements in a manner which permits a direct comparison with these standards.


The defining of performance standards undertakes at the following three levels:

- Policy-based
- System
- Technical

Where the present work is mainly concerned with the assessment against the standards associated with the first two levels.

The policy-based performance standard relates to this objective to provide a working environment, where the risk to the individual reduced to a level that is ALARP.

This performance standard is therefore, expressed in the form of individual risk and the arrangements for managing this risk should result in a level of 'Individual Risk', based on a proposed Tolerability Criteria, Figure (2).



**Figure (2) Criteria for Individual Risk Tolerability**




The criterion for IR tolerability for workers and to the public outlined in Table (2) and Figure (3).

It should be noted that this criteria proposed only as a guideline. Risk assessment is no substitute to professional judgement.

**Table (2) Proposed Individual Risk (IR) Criteria (per person/year)**

Risk Level	Workers	Public
<i>Intolerable</i>	$> 10^{-3}$ per person/yr.	$> 10^{-4}$ per person/yr.
<i>Negligible</i>	$> 10^{-5}$ per person/yr.	$> 10^{-6}$ per person/yr.



**Figure (3) Proposed Individual Risk Criteria**

Workers would include the Company employees and contractors. The public includes the public, visitors, and any third party who is not directly involved in the Company work activities.

On this basis, we have chosen to set our level of intolerability at Individual Risk for workers of 1 in 1,000 per year, and we define an individual risk of 1 in 100,000 per year as broadly acceptable. Consequently, our ALARP region is between 1 in 1,000 and 1 in 100,000 per person/year.

It is important to ensure that conflict between these subordinate standards and those stemming from international codes and standards are avoided and that any subordinate standards introduced are at least on a par with or augment those standards, which are associated with compliance with these international

Prepared By:  <b>PETROSAFE</b>	 <b>Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company "EGAS"</b>	<b>Page 31 of 112</b>  <b>Date: Nov. 2018</b>
<b>Document Title: Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Study For Al-Waqf Pressure Reduction &amp; Metering Station</b>		

requirements. These system level performance standards are included as part of the summaries from the QRA. These used as the basis for assessing the suitability and sufficiency of ReGas Site arrangements for both protecting personnel on site and members of public from major hazards and securing effective response in an emergency. Failure to meet acceptance criteria at this level results in the identification of remedial measures for assessment both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The analytical work use a system analysis approach and divided into a number of distinct phases:

- Data collection, including results from site-based qualitative assessments.
- Definition of arrangements.
- Qualitative evaluation of arrangements against a catalogue of fire and explosion hazards from other major accident hazards.
- Preparing of event tree analysis models.
- Consolidation of list of design events.
- Analysis of the effect of design events on fire, explosion and toxic hazard management and emergency response arrangements.
- Quantification of that impact in terms of individual risk.

The main model would base on a systems approach, and it takes the following form:

- Estimates of incremental individual risk (IIR) per person/yr.
- Is caused-consequences based.
- Uses event tree analysis to calculate the frequency of occurrence.
- Estimates incremental individual risk utilizing event tree analysis, based on modeling the emergency response arrangements from detection through to recovery to a place of safety.

## Personnel Vulnerability and Structural Damage

A criterion used in the QRA study for the calculation of personnel vulnerability and structural / asset damage because of fire, explosion and toxic release shown in Table (3).

The criteria shown below provide some assumptions for the impairment effects of hydrocarbon releases on personnel and structures, which based on Health and Safety Executive: Methods of approximation and determination of human vulnerability for offshore major accident hazard assessment.

**Table (3) Criteria for Personnel Vulnerability and Structural Damage**

Event Type	Threshold of Fatality	Asset/Structural Damage
Jet and Diffusive Fire Impingement	6.3 kW/ m <sup>2</sup> (1) 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> (2)	- Flame impingement 10 minutes. - 300 - 500 kW/m <sup>2</sup> Structural Failure within 20 minutes.
Pool Fire Impingement	6.3 kW/ m <sup>2</sup> (1) 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> (2)	- Flame impingement 20 minutes - 100 - 150 kW/m <sup>2</sup> Structural Failure within 30 minutes.
Smoke	2.3% v/v (3) 15% v/v (4)	
Explosion Overpressure	300 mbar	100 mbar

- (1) Fatality within 1 - 2 minutes
- (2) Fatal < 1 minute
- (3) Above 2.3%, escape possible but difficult
- (4) No escape possible, fatal in a few seconds

The effects of exposure to fire expressed in terms of heat radiation (kW/m<sup>2</sup>) and overpressure waves shown in Tables (4), (5) and (6).

**Table (4) Heat Radiation Effects on Structures (World Bank)**

Radiation Level kW/m <sup>2</sup>	Observed Effect
37.5	Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment.
25	Minimum energy to ignite wood at indefinitely long exposure (non-piloted).
12.5	Minimum energy required to ignite wood, melting of plastic tubing.

**Table (5) Heat Radiation Effects on People**

Radiation Level kW/m <sup>2</sup>	Effects on People
1.2	Equivalent to heat from sun at midday summer.
1.6	Minimum level at which pain can be sensed.
4 - 6	Pain caused in 15 - 20 seconds, Second Degree burns after 30 seconds.
12	20 % chance of fatality for 60 seconds exposure.
25	100 % chance of fatality for continuous exposure. 50 % chance of fatality for 30 seconds exposure.
40	30 % chance of fatality for 15 seconds exposure.
50	100 % chance of fatality for 20 seconds exposure.

***Table (6) Effects of Overpressure***

Pressure		Effects / Damage
bar	psig	
0.002	0.03	Occasional breakage of glass windows.
0.006	0.1	Breakage of some small windows.
0.021	0.3	Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05. 10 % glass broken.
0.027	0.4	Minor structural damage of buildings.
0.068	1.0	Partial collapse of walls and roofs, possible injuries.
0.137	2.0	Some severe injuries, death unlikely.
0.206	3.0	Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation.
0.275	4.0	Oil storage tanks ruptured.
0.344	5.0	Wooden utilities poles snapped / Fatalities.
0.41	6.0	Nearly complete destruction of building.
0.48	7.0	Loaded wagon train overturned.
0.689	10.0	Total destruction of buildings.

## Quantification of the Frequency of Occurrence

The probability of a sequence of events leading to a major hazard is dependent on the probability of each event in a sequence occurring; usually these probabilities may be multiplied together to obtain the end event probability or frequency.

The technique of Quantified Risk Assessment 'QRA' requires data in the form of probability or frequency to be estimated for each input event.

Ideally, data relating to hardware failures and human error that are specific to each plant should be obtained from the company's maintenance and historical records.

Unfortunately, records available were not in the form that allows data relevant to this study to be obtained. Therefore, other sources of data were used as a basis for failure/error scenarios. The sources of information and data are shown in the References section of this report.

## Identification of Scenarios Leading to Selected Failures

For each selected failure scenario, the potential contributory factors were examined, taking into account any protective features available. Typically, the factors examined included:

- Operator error
- Metallurgical fatigue or ageing of materials
- Internal or external Corrosion
- Loss of process control, e.g. pressure, temperature or flow, etc.
- Overfilling of vessels
- Introduction of impurities
- Fire and/or explosion
- Missiles
- Flooding

Account was taken at this stage of those limited releases, which, although in themselves did not constitute a significant off-site hazard could, under some circumstances, initiate a sequence leading to a larger release, as a knock-on effect.

It was noted that the proposed criterion for risk tolerability was used in Egypt by the following organizations: British Gas / British Petroleum / Shell / Total.



## Relevant Weather Data for the Study

### - Weather Data

The Weather Data relevant to this study consists of a list of weather conditions in the form of different combinations of wind-speed/direction, temperature, humidity and atmospheric stability. Table (7)

The weather conditions are an important input into the dispersion calculations and results for a single set of conditions could give a misleading picture of the hazard potential.

Met-oceanographic data gathered from Weather base for Qena Governorate over a period of some years.

These data included wind speed, wind direction, air temperature and humidity, as well as current speed, direction and wave height.

**Table (7) Annual Average Temperature, Relative Humidity and Wind Speed / Direction**

<b>• Air Temperature °C</b>		
	Min. Recorded	13.4 °C
	Max. Recorded	28.9 °C
	<i>Annual Average</i>	<i>24.3 °C</i>
<b>• Relative Humidity %</b>		
	Average Daily Min.	40.6 %
	Average Daily Max.	61.7 %
	<i>Annual Average</i>	<i>40.5 %</i>
<b>• Wind Speed m/s</b>		
	<i>Annual Average</i>	<i>3.2 m / sec.</i>
<b>• Wind Direction</b>		
	<i>Annual Average</i>	<i>NW / WNW</i>

The general climatic conditions at Qena Governorate are summarized in Tables No. (8, 9 & 10) Below.

**Table (8) Mean of Monthly Air Temperature (°C)**

Months	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Temp. (c°)	14.5	16.3	20.1	25.1	29	31.5	31.7	31.1	29.3	26	20.5	16.1


**Table (9) Mean of Monthly Wind Speed (m/sec)**

Months	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Wind Speed (m/sec)	3.30	3.38	3.5	3.69	3.5	3.5	3.38	3.30	3.38	2.40	2.3	2.3

**Table (10) Mean of Monthly Average Relative Humidity**

Months	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Relative Humidity (%)	53.4	46.2	39.3	32.8	28.6	29.5	33.5	36.7	39.9	42.5	49.6	54.3


Figure (4) shows the maximum temperature diagram for Qena Governorate




**Figure (4) – Monthly Variations of the Maximum Temperature – Qena Governorate**



Figures (5 & 6) show the monthly variations of the wind speed as well as wind rose for Qena Governorate respectively.




*Figure (5) – Monthly Variations of the Wind Speed – Qena Governorate*



*Figure (6) – Wind Rose – Qena Governorate*



Figure (7) shows the monthly variations of the sunny, cloudy and precipitation days for Qena Governorate.



*Figure (7) – Monthly Variations of the Sunny, Cloudy and Precipitation days for Qena Governorate*

### - Stability Categories

The two most significant variables, which would affect the dispersion calculations, are Wind-speed and atmospheric stability. The stability class is a measure of the atmospheric turbulence caused by thermal gradients. Pasqual Stability identifies six main categories, which shown in the Tables (11 & 12) and summarized in Table (13).

**Table (11) Pasqual Stability Categories**

<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>C</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>E</b>	<b>F</b>
Very Unstable	Unstable	Moderately Unstable	Neutral	Moderately Stable	Stable

Neutral conditions correspond to a vertical temperature gradient of about 1°C per 100 m.

**Table (12) Relationship between Wind Speed and Stability**

Wind speed	Day-time Solar Radiation			Night-time Cloud Cover		
(m/s)	Strong	Medium	Slight	Thin <3/8	Medium >3/8	Overcast >4/5
<2	A	A-B	B	-	-	D
2-3	A-B	B	C	E	F	D
3-5	B	B-C	C	D	E	D
5-6	C	C-D	D	D	D	D
>6	C	D	D	D	D	D

**Table (13) Sets of Weather Conditions Initially Selected for this Study**

Set for Wind Speed and Stability	
Wind speed	Stability
3.2 m/sec.	D

## AlWaqf PRMS Description

### Background

AlWaqf Pressure Reduction and Metering Station Operated by Regional Gas Company "ReGas". It is located about 7 km East direction from AlWaqf City downtown. The PRMS will provide the natural gas to AlWaqf area public housing.

The PRMS feeding will be from the National Gas Pipeline owned by GASCO by off-take point at a distance of about 950 m from the PRMS premises. The off-take point pressure will be from 18 to 70 bar, and then the pressure reduced to 7 bar at the PRMS facilities with adding odorant, and then connected to the internal distribution network to public housing at AlWaqf area.

### The PRMS & Off-Take Point Location Coordinates (ReGas Data)


Point	PRMS		Off-take Point	
	North (N)	East (E)	North (N)	East (E)
1	26 ° 05 ' 46.19 "	32 ° 29 ' 23.39 "	26 ° 05 ' 57.67 "	32 ° 29 ' 41.66 "
2	26 ° 05 ' 46.30 "	32 ° 29 ' 24.45 "	26 ° 05 ' 57.78 "	32 ° 29 ' 42.27 "
3	26 ° 05 ' 44.03 "	32 ° 29 ' 24.74 "	26 ° 05 ' 58.26 "	32 ° 29 ' 41.52 "
4	26 ° 05 ' 44.12 "	32 ° 29 ' 24.08 "	26 ° 05 ' 58.40 "	32 ° 29 ' 42.09 "

### PRMS Brief Description and Components (ReGas Data)

The PRMS will be surround by 3 m height fence and mainly consist of the followings: (Ref. Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11)

- Inlet module: which contains 4" # 600 manual isolation valve.
- Filter module: two identical streams each contain inlet and outlet isolation valves.
- Heating system module: two identical.
- Metering module: two identical.
- Regulating module: two identical regulating lines.
- Outlet module: it contains manual outlet isolation valve.
- Odorant module: 25 lit. capacity container.
- Off-take point will be from up-ground room surrounded by 3 m height brick wall fence containing connection pipes and isolation valves with GASCO underground pipeline 4", connected to 4" PRMS feeding pipeline.
- Security Office (one floor)
- Administration office (one floor)
- Firefighting Facilities (Fire Water Tank / Pumps / Fire water Network)





**Figure (8) Al-Waqf PRMS and Off-Take Point Plotted on Google Earth Photo**





Figure (9) Al-Waqf PRMS General Layout (ReGas Data)





**Figure (10) El Waqf Pressure Reduction Station and Surroundings Plotted on Google Earth Photo**





**Figure (11) El Waqf Off-Take Point and Surroundings Plotted on Google Earth Photo**

### **Pressure Reduction and Metering Station (PRMS)**

Consists of equipment installed for automatically reducing and regulating the pressure in the downstream pipeline or main to which it is connected. Included are piping and auxiliary devices such as valves, control instruments, control lines, the enclosure, and ventilation equipment.

PRMS required for AlWaqf city having an inlet pressure range (18-70 bar g) and outlet pressure 7 bar g and maximum flow rate 15000 SCMH.

### **Pressure Reduction Station Mechanical Works**

Constructing Pressure Reduction Stations and city gate regulators are regular construction works in addition to connections between transmission mains and distribution mains.

The PRMS comprises two types of pressures; the first is the upstream pressure, which a high pressure is ranging from 18 to 70 Bar, while the second pressure is the downstream pressure, which is a low-pressure (7 bar) Inlet stage.

The inlet components of the PRMS should be completely isolated from the cathodic system applied to the feeding steel pipes. This is achieved by installing isolating joint with protection.

### **Filtration Stage**

The aim of the filtration stage is to remove dust, rust, solid contaminants and liquid traces. Two filters and two separators are installed in parallel; each filter-separator operates with the full capacity of the PRMS. Filter-separator lines are equipped with safety devices such as differential pressure gauges, relief valves, liquid indicators, etc.

### **Heating Stage**

Because the difference between the inlet and outlet pressure is relatively high, icing normally occurs around outlet pipes. This may cause blockings and accordingly reduce or stop the gas flow. To avoid such circumstances, a heater is installed to keep the temperature of outlet pipes over 7 °C. Each PRMS is equipped with two heaters in parallel in order to allow for a standby heater in emergencies.

### **Reduction Stage**

Each PRMS includes two reduction lines in parallel, also to allow for a standby line. The lines are equipped with safety gauges, indicators and transmitters to maintain safe operation conditions. According to the IGM standards, the reduction unit should be installed in a well-ventilated-closed area or, alternatively, in an open protected area.

## Measuring Stage

After adjusting the outlet pressure, gas flow and cumulative consumption then measured to monitor Natural Gas consumption from the PRMS and to adjust the dosing of the odorant as indicated below. Measuring devices should be sensitive to low gas flow, which normally occurs during the first stages after connecting a small portion of targeted clients.

## Odorizing Stage

The objective of the odorant is to enable the detection of gas leaks in residential units at low concentration, before gas concentration becomes hazardous. The normally used odorant is composed of Tert-butyl mercaptan (TBM) (80%) and Methyl-sulphide (20%). The normal dosing rate of the odorant is 12-24 mg/cm<sup>3</sup>. The system consists of stainless steel tank with a capacity of 600 liters and small vessel with capacity of 50 liters for daily use.

## Outlet Stage

The outlet stage includes an outlet valve gauge, temperature indicators, pressure and temperature transmitters and non-return valves. The outlet pipes are also, like inlet pipes, isolated from the cathodic protection by an isolating joint.

## Operating Philosophy and Control

Automatically reducing of pressure according to setting pressure of regulators and monitored by control room.

## Shutdown and Isolation Philosophy

Pressure reduction station consist of main inlet and outlet valves to isolate PRMS in any Emergency case under specific procedure. In order to isolate PRMS in crisis and no any access available buried valves outside PRMS contours shall be used.

## Fire Protection Facilities

The following table describes the firefighting facilities at the PRMS:



<i>Firefighting Network</i>		For Occupied Offices and PRMS Facilities
<i>Standalone Steel Tank and Bored Well.</i>		
<i>Fire Alarm Control System</i>		For Occupied Offices
<i>Fire Extinguisher</i>	<i>CO<sub>2</sub> Type</i>	For Electricity Type Fire
	<i>Foam Type</i>	For Fire Due to Odorant
	<i>Powder Type</i>	For Any Type of Fire

### Gas Odorant Specifications

The odorant supplied with a Hazard Data Sheet and identified as Spotleak 1009. Spotleak is an aliphatic mixture in clear liquid form that is extremely flammable, with the following characteristics:

- Boiling Range 60-70° C
- Flash Point -17.8° C
- Freezing Point -45.5° C
- Density (H<sub>2</sub>O = 1) 0.812 @ 15.5° C
- Vapor Density 3.0 (air = 1)
- Vapor Pressure (mm Hg) 6.6 @ 37.8° C

### Health Hazards

Spotleak is not carcinogenic, but the major health hazards as a result of exposure to Spotleak include the following:

#### Inhalation

- Short-term exposure: Irritation and central nervous system effects
- Long-term exposure: Irritation

#### Skin Contact

- Short-term: Irritation
- Long-term: Dermatitis

#### Eye Contact

- Short-term: Irritation and tearing
- Long-term: Irritation

### *Ingestion*

- Short-term: nausea, vomiting, central nervous system effects
- Long-term: no effects are known

### *Hygiene Standards and Limits*

Occupational Exposure Limit for Spotleak to all components is 45 ppm, and the long-term "MEL" should be below 12 ppm (8 hrs. "TWA").

### *Fire and Explosion Hazards*

Spotleak is a severe fire hazard. Vapor/air mixtures are explosive. Vapor is 3 times heavier than air. Vapor may ignite at distant ignition sources and flash back.

Thermal decomposition products include oxides of sulphur and hydrogen sulphide.

## **Emergency Response Plan "ERP"**

An Emergency Response Plan "ERP" for El Waqf PRS to be prepared by ReGas; during Construction phase, and planned to include the following items:

- ERP objectives,
- Emergency levels,
- Notification Chart,
- Main Emergency Room Members Contacts,
- ReGas Branches Contacts,
- Calling of External Aids / Authorities at El Waqf Area,
- Roles & Responsibilities,
  - Area Security Manager Responsibilities;
  - Firefighting Team Responsibilities;
  - Rescue & Evacuation Responsibilities;
  - Document Control Team Responsibilities;
  - First Aid Team Responsibilities;
  - Power Shutdown Team Responsibilities;
  - Communications Team Responsibilities;
- Emergency Procedures in case of Potential Risks.

## Analytical Results of Consequence Modeling

### 1.0- Pressure Reduction Station Inlet Pipeline (4 inch)

#### 1/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release

The following table no. (14) Show that:

*Table (14) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 1" / 4" Gas Release*


Gas Release (Inlet / PRV "High Pressure")					
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)	
3.2 D	UFL	0.97	1	0.10 @ 0.50 m	
	LFL	3.80	1	0.36 @ 2.50 m	
	50 % LFL	6.60	0 – 1.03	1.35 @ 4.50 m	

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m <sup>2</sup> )	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.2 D	6.25	1.6	8	4.60	0
		4	5.60	2.50	0
		9.5	2.36	0.60	0
		12.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	20% /60 sec.
		25	Not Reached	Not Reached	80.34
		37.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	98.74


Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)					
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)		Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
		Early	Late		
3.2 D	0.020	N/D	N/D	<b>0.021 bar</b>	<i>Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken</i>
	0.137	N/D	N/D	<b>0.137 bar</b>	<i>Some severe injuries, death unlikely</i>
	0.206	N/D	N/D	<b>0.206 bar</b>	<i>Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation</i>



**Figure (12) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (1" hole in 4" Inlet Pipeline)**

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 1" hole size without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 6 m downwind and from 0 – 1.03 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 0.97 m downwind with a height of 1 m. The cloud large width will be 0.10 m crosswind at a distance of 0.50 m from the source.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 3.80 m downwind with a height of 1 m. The cloud large width will be 0.36 m crosswind at a distance of 2.50 m from the source.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 6.60 m downwind with a height from 0 to 1.03 m. The cloud large width will be 1.35 m crosswind at a distance of 4.50 m from the source.

*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary.*



**Figure (13) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (1" hole in 4" Inlet Pipeline)**

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 1" hole size and ignited the expected flame length is about 6.25 meters downwind.
- The 4 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 5.60 meters downwind and 2.50 meters crosswind.
- The 9.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 2.360 meters downwind and 0.60 meters crosswind..
- The 12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation not reached.
- The 25 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation not reached.
- The 37.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation not reached.

*The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 4 & 9.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> will be limited inside the PRMS boundary. The values of 12.5, 25 & 37,5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> not determined by the software due to small amount of the gas released.*


## 1/2- Consequence Modeling for 2 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (15) Show that:

**Table (15) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 2" / 4" Gas Release**

Gas Release					
Wind Category	Flammability Limits		Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)
3.2 D	UFL		3	1	0.30 @ 1.60 m
	LFL		11.40	1.03	1.20 @ 7.00 m
	50 % LFL		22	0 – 2.60	2.60 @ 17.00 m
Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.2 D	17.24	1.6	27	18.70	0
		4	21	11.64	0
		9.5	16.50	6.60	0
		12.5	14.80	5.14	20% /60 sec.
		25	11.50	1.95	80.34
		37.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	98.74
Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)					
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)		Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
		Early	Late		
3.2 D	0.020	N/D	43	0.021 bar	Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken
	0.137	N/D	26	0.137 bar	Some severe injuries, death unlikely
	0.206	N/D	24	0.206 bar	Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation






**Figure (14) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (2" hole in 4" Inlet Pipeline)**

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 2" hole size without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance about 22 m downwind and from 0 to 2.60 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 3 m downwind with a height of 1 m. The cloud large width will be 0.30 m crosswind at a distance of 1.60 m from the source.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 11.40 m downwind with a height of 1.03 m. The cloud large width will be 1.20 m crosswind at a distance of 7 m from the source.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 22 m downwind with a height from 0 to 2.60 m. The cloud large width will be 2.60 m crosswind at a distance of 17 m from the source.


*The modeling shows that the gas cloud (50 % LFL) will extend to be near to the admin office downwind.*



**Figure (15) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (2" hole in 4" Inlet Pipeline)**

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 2" hole size and ignited the expected flame length is about 17.24 meters downwind.
- The 9.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 16.50 meters downwind and 6.60 meters crosswind.
- The 12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 14.80 meters downwind and 5.14 meters crosswind.
- The 25 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 11.50 meters downwind and 1.95 meters crosswind.
- The 37.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation not determined.

*The modeling shows that the values of 9.5 & 12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> will effects the firefighting facilities crosswind northeast side.*



**Figure (16) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves (2" hole in 4" Inlet Pipeline)**

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 2" hole size and late ignited this will give an explosion with different values of overpressure waves.
- The 0.020 bar overpressure waves will extend about 43 meters downwind.
- The 0.137 bar overpressure waves will extend about 26 meters downwind.
- The 0.206 bar overpressure waves will extend about 24 meters downwind.

*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will cover the admin room (downwind) and firefighting facility (crosswind) and extend outside the PRMS boundary from the east and west sides not reaching surrounds.*

*The values of 0.137 and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and near to the admin office and firefighting facilities.*


### 1/3- Consequence Modeling for 4 inch (Full Rupture) Gas Release

The following table no. (16) Show that:

**Table (16) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 4" Gas Release**

Gas Release					
Wind Category	Flammability Limits		Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)
3.2 D	UFL		6	1	0.60 @ 3.00 m
	LFL		32	0 – 1.35	2.80 @ 20.00 m
	50 % LFL		63.50	0 – 4	5.40 @ 63.50 m
Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m <sup>2</sup> )	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.2 D	31.93	1.6	56.90	37.50	0
		4	41.30	23.50	0
		9.5	31.80	13.90	0
		12.5	28.70	11.20	20 %/60 sec.
		25	23.30	5.30	80.34
		37.5	15.20	2.70	98.74
Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)					
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)		Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
		Early	Late		
3.2 D	0.020	N/D	126	0.021 bar	Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken
	0.137	N/D	84	0.137 bar	Some severe injuries, death unlikely
	0.206	N/D	81	0.206 bar	Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation
Fireball					
Wind Category	Heat Radiation (kW/m <sup>2</sup> )	Distance (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m <sup>2</sup> ) Effects on People & Structures		
3.2 D	1.6	Not Determined	12.5 20 % Chance of fatality for 60 sec exposure		
	4	Not Determined			
	9.5	Not Determined	25 100 % Chance of fatality for continuous exposure 50 % Chance of fatality for 30 sec exposure		
	12.5	Not Determined			
	25	Not Determined	37.5 Sufficient of cause process equipment damage		
	37.5	Not Determined			






**Figure (17) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (4" Inlet Pipeline Full Rupture)**

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 4" pipeline full rupture without ignition, the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 63 m downwind and over 4 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 6 m downwind with a height of 1 m. The cloud large width will be 0.60 m crosswind at a distance of 3 m from the source.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 32 m downwind with a height from 0 to 1.35 m. The cloud large width will be 2.80 m crosswind at a distance of 20 m from the source.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 63.50 m downwind with a height from 0 to 4 m. The large width will be 5.40 m crosswind at a distance of 63.50 m from the source.

*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects (LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend to reach the admin office and over SE boundary reaching a distance of about 13 m from the east fence downwind near to the public building boundary.*

*The UFL and LFL will reach the admin office downwind.*




**Figure (18) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (4" Inlet Pipeline Full Rupture)**

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 4" pipeline full rupture and ignited the expected flame length is about 31.93 meters downwind.
- The  $9.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation contours extend about 31.80 meters downwind and 13.90 meters crosswind.
- The  $12.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation contours extend about 28.70 meters downwind and 11.20 meters crosswind.
- The  $25 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation contours extend about 23.30 meters downwind and 5.30 meters crosswind.
- The  $37.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation contours extend about 15.20 meters downwind and 2.70 meters.

*The modeling shows that the heat radiation values  $9.5$ ,  $12.5$  &  $25 \text{ kW/m}^2$  will cover the admin office downwind and firefighting facilities crosswind, and with some extension ( $9.5$  &  $12.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$ ) outside with no effects.*





**Figure (19) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves (4" Inlet Pipeline Full Rupture)**

- The previous figure shows that if there is gas release from 4" pipeline full rupture and late ignited this will give an explosion with different values of overpressure waves.
- The 0.020 bar overpressure waves will extend about 126 meters downwind.
- The 0.137 bar overpressure waves will extend about 84 meters downwind.
- The 0.206 bar overpressure waves will extend about 81 meters downwind.

*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020, 0.137 & 0.206 bar will extend outside the PRMS boundary from southeast side covering the public house and the external road, with no effects inside the PRMS (0.137 & 0.206 bar).*

## 2.0- Pressure Reduction Station Outlet Pipeline (8 inch)

### 2/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release

The following table no. (17) Show that:

**Table (17) Dispersion Modeling for Outlet - 1" / 8" Gas Release**


Gas Release (Outlet / PRV "Low Pressure")					
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)	
3.2 D	UFL	1.15	1	0.10 @ 0.50 m	
	LFL	4.10	1.03	0.40 @ 2.50 m	
	50 % LFL	6.85	0 – 1.76	1.76 @ 7.00 m	

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m <sup>2</sup> )	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.2 D	6.71	1.6	8.90	5.24	0
		4	6.40	2.90	0
		9.5	3.30	0.94	0
		12.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	20% /60 sec.
		25	Not Reached	Not Reached	80.34
		37.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	98.74


Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)					
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)		Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
		Early	Late		
3.2 D	0.020	51	N/D	0.021 bar	Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken
	0.137	13	N/D	0.137 bar	Some severe injuries, death unlikely
	0.206	10	N/D	0.206 bar	Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation



**Figure (20) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (1" hole in 8" Outlet Pipeline)**

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 1" hole size without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 6 m downwind and over 1.76 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 1.15 m downwind with a height of 1 m. The cloud large width will be 0.10 m crosswind at a distance of 0.50 m from the source.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 4.10 m downwind with a height of 1.03 m. The cloud large width will be 0.40 m crosswind at a distance of 2.50 m from the source.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 6.85 m downwind with a height of from 0 to 1.76 m. The cloud large width will be 1.76 m crosswind at a distance of 7 m from the source.

*The modeling shows that the gas cloud will be limited inside the PRMS boundary.*



**Figure (21) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (1" hole in 8" Outlet Pipeline)**

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 1" hole size and ignited the expected flame length is about 6.71 meters downwind.
- The 1.6 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 8.90 meters downwind and 5.24 meters crosswind.
- The 4 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 6.40 meters downwind and 2.90 meters crosswind.
- The 9.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 3.30 meters downwind and 0.94 meters crosswind.
- The 12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation not reached.
- The 25 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation not reached.
- The 37.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation not reached.

*The modeling shows that the heat radiation value 1.6, 4 & 9.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary downwind with no effects of 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup>, which not determined by the software.*





**Figure (22) Early Explosion Overpressure Waves (1" hole in 8" Outlet Pipeline)**

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 1" hole size and early ignited this will give an explosion with different values of overpressure waves.
- The 0.020 bar overpressure waves will extend about 51 meters radius.
- The 0.137 bar overpressure waves will extend about 13 meters radius.
- The 0.206 bar overpressure waves will extend about 10 meters radius.

*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will cover the PRMS components and extend outside the boundary from all sides near to the public houses (down and crosswind).*

*The values of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS boundary affecting the PRMS facilities and reaching the firefighting facilities crosswind.*

## 2/2- Consequence Modeling for 4 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (18) Show that:

**Table (18) Dispersion Modeling for Outlet - 4" / 8" Gas Release**

Gas Release					
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)	
3.2 D	UFL	5.60	1	0.50 @ 3.00 m	
	LFL	16.30	0 – 2.30	2.30 @ 16.30 m	
	50 % LFL	16.35	0 – 3.10	3.10 @ 16.35m	


  

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m <sup>2</sup> )	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.2 D	30.18	1.6	52.30	34.80	0
		4	38.40	21.80	0
		9.5	29.70	12.80	0
		12.5	26.80	21.80	20% /60 sec.
		25	21.80	4.80	80.34
		37.5	14	2.40	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)					
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)		Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
		Early	Late		
3.2 D	0.020	51	59	<b>0.021 bar</b>	Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken
	0.137	13	32	<b>0.137 bar</b>	Some severe injuries, death unlikely
	0.206	10	31	<b>0.206 bar</b>	Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation






**Figure (23) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (4" hole in 8" Outlet Pipeline)**

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 4" hole size without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 16 m downwind and 3 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 5.60 m downwind with a height of 1 m. The cloud large width will be 0.50 m crosswind at a distance of 3 m from the source.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 16.30 m downwind with a height from 0 to 2.30 m. The cloud large width will be 2.30 m crosswind at a distance of 16.30 m from the source.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 16.35 m downwind with a height from 0 to 3 m. The cloud large width will be 3.10 m crosswind at a distance of 16.35 m from the source.

*The modeling shows that the gas cloud (UFL, LFL & 50% LFL) will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and will be near to the admin office.*



**Figure (24) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (4" hole in 8" Outlet Pipeline)**

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 4" hole size and ignited the expected flame length is about 30 meters downwind.
- The  $9.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation contours extend about 29.70 meters downwind and 12.80 meters crosswind.
- The  $12.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation contours extend about 26.80 meters downwind and 10.30 meters crosswind.
- The  $25 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation contours extend about 21.80 meters downwind and 4.80 meters crosswind.
- The  $37.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation contours extend about 14 meters downwind and 2.40 meters crosswind.

*The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5  $\text{kW/m}^2$  will be limited inside the PRMS boundary affecting the admin office.*




**Figure (25) Early Explosion Overpressure Waves (4" hole in 8" Outlet Pipeline)**

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 4" hole size and early ignited this will give an explosion with different values of overpressure waves.
- The 0.020 bar overpressure waves will extend about 51 meters radius.
- The 0.137 bar overpressure waves will extend about 13 meters radius.
- The 0.206 bar overpressure waves will extend about 10 meters radius.

*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will cover the PRMS components and extend outside the boundary from all sides near to the public houses (down and crosswind).*

*The values of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS boundary affecting the PRMS facilities and reaching the firefighting facilities crosswind.*





**Figure (26) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves (4" hole in 8" Inlet Pipeline)**

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 4" hole size and late ignited this will give an explosion with different values of overpressure waves.
- The 0.020 bar overpressure waves will extend about 59 meters downwind.
- The 0.137 bar overpressure waves will extend about 32 meters downwind.
- The 0.206 bar overpressure waves will extend about 31 meters downwind.

*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend PRMS boundary covering the PRMS components inside and outside from southeast side reaching the public building.*

*The value of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS extend to the southeast behind the admin office.*

### 2/3- Consequence Modeling for 8 inch (Full Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (19) Show that:

**Table (19) Dispersion Modeling for Outlet - 8" Gas Release**

Gas Release					
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)	
3.2 D	UFL	13.30	1	1.20	
	LFL	14.30	0 – 3.10	2.60	
	50 % LFL	14.35	0 – 3.60	3.60	

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m <sup>2</sup> )	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.2 D	55.60	1.6	102.80	69.40	0
		4	77.10	43.60	0
		9.5	54.40	26.20	0
		12.5	48.60	21.40	20% /60 sec.
		25	38.40	11.30	80.34
		37.5	27	7	98.74


  

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)					
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)		Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
		Early	Late		
3.2 D	0.020	51	59	<b>0.021 bar</b>	<i>Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken</i>
	0.137	13	32	<b>0.137 bar</b>	<i>Some severe injuries, death unlikely</i>
	0.206	10	31	<b>0.206 bar</b>	<i>Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation</i>

Fireball			
Wind Category	Heat Radiation (kW/m <sup>2</sup> )	Distance (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m <sup>2</sup> ) Effects on People & Structures
3.2 D	1.6	32	<b>12.5</b>
	4	19	<b>25</b>
	9.5	10	<b>100 % Chance of fatality for continuous exposure</b>
	12.5	8	<b>50 % Chance of fatality for 30 sec exposure</b>
	25	Not Reached	<b>37.5</b>
	37.5	Not Reached	<b>Sufficient of cause process equipment damage</b>






**Figure (27) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (8" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture)**

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 8" pipeline full rupture without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 14 m downwind and over 3.60 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 13.30 m downwind with a height of 1 m. The cloud large width will be 1.20 m crosswind.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 14.30 m downwind with a height from 0 to 3.10 m. The cloud large width will be 2.60 m crosswind.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 14.35 m downwind with a height from 0 to 3.60 m. The cloud large width will be 3.60 m crosswind.


*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and near to the admin office downwind.*



**Figure (28) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (8" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture)**

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 8" pipeline full rupture and ignited the expected flame length is about 55.60 meters downwind.
- The 9.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 54.40 meters downwind and 26.20 meters crosswind.
- The 12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 48.60 meters downwind and 21.40 meters crosswind.
- The 25 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 38.40 meters downwind and 11.30 meters crosswind.
- The 37.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 27 meters downwind and 7 meters crosswind.

*The modeling shows that all radiation values will affects the admin office and extend outside the PRMS from southeast side near to the public building (9 & 12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup>) downwind.*




**Figure (29) Early Explosion Overpressure Waves (8" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture)**

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 8" pipeline full rupture and early ignited this will give an explosion with different values of overpressure waves.
- The 0.020 bar overpressure waves will extend about 51 meters radius.
- The 0.137 bar overpressure waves will extend about 13 meters radius.
- The 0.206 bar overpressure waves will extend about 10 meters radius.

*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will cover the PRMS components and extend outside the boundary from all sides near to the public houses (down and crosswind).*

*The values of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS boundary affecting the PRMS facilities and reaching the firefighting facilities crosswind.*






**Figure (30) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves (8" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture)**

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 8" pipeline full rupture and late ignited this will give an explosion with different values of overpressure waves.
- The 0.020 bar overpressure waves will extend about 59 meters downwind.
- The 0.137 bar overpressure waves will extend about 32 meters downwind.
- The 0.206 bar overpressure waves will extend about 31 meters downwind.

*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend PRMS boundary covering the PRMS components inside and outside from southeast side reaching the public building.*

*The value of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will extend outside the PRMS from the southeast side with no effects on the public building downwind.*



**Figure (31) Heat Radiation Contours from Fireball (8" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture)**

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 8" pipeline full rupture and ignited forming fireball this will gives a heat radiation with different values and contours and will extend in four dimensions.
- The  $9.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation contours extend about 10 meters radius.
- The  $12.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation contours extend about 8 meters radius.
- The  $25 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation not reached.
- The  $37.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation not reached.

*The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of  $9.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  &  $12.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and near to the firefighting facilities crosswind.*




### 3.0- Pressure Reduction Station Odorant Tank (Spotleak)

The following table no. (20) Show 1" hole leak form odorant Modeling:

**Table (20) Dispersion Modeling for Odorant Tank**

Gas Release					
Wind Category	Flammability Limits		Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)
3.2 D	UFL		18.18	0 – 0.25	12
	LFL		23.30	0 – 0.26	16
	50 % LFL		31.96	0 – 0.53	21
Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.2 D	16.22	1.6	40.80	25.35	0
		4	30.50	16.30	0
		9.5	24.60	10.80	0
		12.5	23.10	9.30	20% /60 sec.
		25	19.80	5.90	80.34
		37.5	17	4.10	98.74
Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)					
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)		Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
		Early	Late		
3.2 D	0.020	N/D	71	0.021 bar	Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken
	0.137	N/D	18	0.137 bar	Some severe injuries, death unlikely
	0.206	N/D	14	0.206 bar	Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation




**Figure (32) Vapor Cloud (UFL/LFL) Side View Graph (Odorant leak)**


- The previous figures show that if there is a leak from odorant tank without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 31 m downwind and from 0 to 0.53 m height (the vapors heavier than air).
- The UFL ( $2.1\text{E}+04$  ppm) will reach a distance of about 18.18 m downwind with a height from 0 to 0.25 m. The cloud large width will be 12 m crosswind.
- The LFL ( $1.4\text{E}+04$  ppm) will reach a distance of about 23.30 m downwind with a height from 0 to 0.26 m. The cloud large width will be 16 m crosswind.
- The 50 % LFL (7000 ppm) will reach a distance of about 31.96 m downwind with a height from 0 to 0.53 m. The cloud large width will be 21 m crosswind.

*The modeling shows that the vapor cloud will be limited inside the PRMS boundary reaching the admin office downwind.*


*Consideration should be taken when deal with liquid, vapors and smokes according to the MSDS for the material.*



**Figure (33) Heat Radiation Contours - Jet Fire Graph (Odorant Leak)**



**Figure (34) Heat Radiation Contours - Jet Fire on Site (Odorant Leak)**

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<div data-bbox="260 367 1422 918"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The previous figure show that if there is a leak from the odorant tank and ignited the expected flame length is about 40 meters downwind.</li> <li>- The 9.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 24.60 meters downwind and 10.80 meters crosswind.</li> <li>- The 12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 23.10 meters downwind and 9.30 meters crosswind.</li> <li>- The 25 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 19.80 meters downwind and 5.90 meters crosswind.</li> <li>- The 37.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 17 meters downwind and 4.10 meters crosswind.</li> </ul> </div> <div data-bbox="260 952 1422 1039"> <p><i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation will be limited inside the PRMS boundary with some extension outside from southwest side with no effects.</i></p> </div>		



Prepared By:

PETROSAFE



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


Figure (35) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves Graph (Odorant Leak)





Figure (36) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves on Site (Odorant Leak)



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<b>Document Title: Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Study For Al-Waqf Pressure Reduction &amp; Metering Station</b>		
<div data-bbox="260 367 1423 844"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The previous figure show that if there is a leak from the odorant tank and late ignited this will give an explosion with different values of overpressure waves.</li> <li>- The 0.020 bar overpressure waves will extend about 71 meters downwind.</li> <li>- The 0.137 bar overpressure waves will extend about 18 meters downwind.</li> <li>- The 0.206 bar overpressure waves will extend about 14 meters downwind.</li> </ul> </div> <div data-bbox="260 880 1423 965"> <p><i>The modeling shows that all values will be limited inside the PRMS boundary effecting the admin office downwind.</i></p> </div>		

#### 4.0- Pressure Reduction Station Off-Take Pipeline (4 inch)

##### 4/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release

The following table no. (21) Show that:

**Table (21) Dispersion Modeling for Off-take - 1" / 4" Gas Release**


Gas Release				
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)
3.2 D	UFL	0.053	1.80	0.10
	LFL	0.31	3.50	0.40
	50 % LFL	0.75	4.70	0.80

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m <sup>2</sup> )	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.2 D	4.90	1.6	12	6.20	0
		4	Not Reached	Not Reached	0
		9.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	0
		12.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	20% /60 sec.
		25	Not Reached	Not Reached	80.34
		37.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)					
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)		Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
		Early	Late		
3.2 D	0.020	N/D	N/D	<b>0.021 bar</b>	<i>Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken</i>
	0.137	N/D	N/D	<b>0.137 bar</b>	<i>Some severe injuries, death unlikely</i>
	0.206	N/D	N/D	<b>0.206 bar</b>	<i>Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation</i>



**Figure (37) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (1" hole in 4" off-take Pipeline)**

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 1" hole size without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance about 0.75 m downwind and 3.30 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 0.052 m downwind with a height of 1.80 m. The cloud large width will be 0.10 m.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 0.31 m downwind with a height of 3.50 m. The cloud large width will be 0.40 m.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 0.75 m downwind with a height 4.70 m. The cloud large width will be 0.80 m.

*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the off-take boundary.*



**Figure (38) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (1" hole in 4" off-take Pipeline)**

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 1" hole size and ignited the expected flame length is about 4.90 meters height.
- The  $1.6 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation contours extend about 12 meters downwind and 6.20 meters crosswind.
- The  $4 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation not determined.
- The  $9.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation not determined.
- The  $12.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation not determined.
- The  $25 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation not determined.
- The  $37.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation not determined.

*The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of  $1.6 \text{ kW/m}^2$  will be limited inside the off-take boundary with some extension outside downwind with no effects.*

*The values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 &  $37.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  not determined by the software as it is very small values.*

#### 4/2- Consequence Modeling for 2 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (22) Show that:

**Table (22) Dispersion Modeling for Off-take - 2" / 4" Gas Release**

Gas Release					
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)	
3.2 D	UFL	0.18	3.40	0.30	
	LFL	1.02	8	1.20	
	50 % LFL	2.42	11	2.80	


  

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m <sup>2</sup> )	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.2 D	13.26	1.6	34.60	17.80	0
		4	8	6.40	0
		9.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	0.72
		12.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	20% /60 sec.
		25	Not Reached	Not Reached	80.34
		37.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)					
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)		Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
		Early	Late		
3.2 D	0.020	N/D	N/D	<b>0.021 bar</b>	Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken
	0.137	N/D	N/D	<b>0.137 bar</b>	Some severe injuries, death unlikely
	0.206	N/D	N/D	<b>0.206 bar</b>	Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation





**Figure (39) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (2" hole in 4" off-take Pipeline)**

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 2" hole size without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 2 m downwind and 11 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 0.18 m downwind with a height of 3.40 m. The cloud large width will be 0.30 m.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 1.02 m downwind with a height of 8 m. The cloud large width will be 1.20 m.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 2.42 m downwind with a height 11 m. The cloud large width will be 2.80 m.

*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the off-take boundary.*



**Figure (40) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (3" hole in 6" off-take Pipeline)**

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 3" hole size and ignited the expected flame length is about 12 meters height.
- The  $1.6 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation contours extend about 34.60 meters downwind and 17.80 meters crosswind.
- The  $4 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation contours extend about 8 meters downwind and 6.40 meters crosswind.
- The  $9.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation not determined.
- The  $12.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation not determined.
- The  $25 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation not determined.
- The  $37.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  heat radiation not determined.

*The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 1.6 will extend outside the off-take boundary from south, east and west sides with a few meters.*

*The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of  $4 \text{ kW/m}^2$  will extend outside the off-take boundary downwind with no effects.*

*The values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 &  $37.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$  not determined by the software as it is very small values.*

### 4/3- Consequence Modeling for 4 inch (Full Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (23) Show that:

**Table (23) Dispersion Modeling for Off-take - 4" Gas Release**

Gas Release					
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)	
3.2 D	UFL	0.37	6	0.80	
	LFL	2.25	15	4.50	
	50 % LFL	5.10	21	6	


Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m <sup>2</sup> )	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.2 D	31.90	1.6	56.80	37.50	0
		4	41.20	23.50	0
		9.5	31.80	13.90	0
		12.5	28.70	11.20	20% /60 sec.
		25	23.20	5.30	80.34
		37.5	15.20	2.70	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)					
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)		Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
		Early	Late		
3.2 D	0.020	N/D	N/D	<b>0.021 bar</b>	<i>Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken</i>
	0.137	N/D	N/D	<b>0.137 bar</b>	<i>Some severe injuries, death unlikely</i>
	0.206	N/D	N/D	<b>0.206 bar</b>	<i>Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation</i>

Fireball			
Wind Category	Heat Radiation (kW/m <sup>2</sup> )	Distance (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m <sup>2</sup> ) Effects on People & Structures
3.2 D	1.6	Not Determined	<b>12.5</b>
	4	Not Determined	<b>25</b>
	9.5	Not Determined	<b>100 % Chance of fatality for continuous exposure</b>
	12.5	Not Determined	<b>50 % Chance of fatality for 30 sec exposure</b>
	25	Not Determined	<b>37.5</b>
	37.5	Not Determined	<b>Sufficient of cause process equipment damage</b>




**Figure (41) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (4" off-take Pipeline Full Rupture)**

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 4" pipeline full rupture without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 5 m downwind and over 21 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 0.37 m downwind with a height of 6 m. The cloud large width will be 0.80 m.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 2.25 m downwind with a height of 15 m. The cloud large width will be 4.50 m.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 5.10 m downwind with a height of 21 m. The cloud large width will be 6 m.

*The modeling shows that the gas cloud will be limited inside the off-take boundary.*





**Figure (42) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (4" off-take Pipeline Full Rupture)**

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 4" pipeline full rupture and ignited the expected flame length is about 31.90 meters height.
- The 9.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 31.80 meters downwind and 13.90 meters crosswind.
- The 12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 28.70 meters downwind and 11.20 meters crosswind.
- The 25 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 23.20 meters downwind and 5.30 meters crosswind.
- The 37.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> heat radiation contours extend about 15.20 meters downwind and 2.70 meters crosswind.

*The modeling shows that the heat radiation values will extend outside the off-take boundary from southeast side downwind with about 50 m covering the outside subway.*

## • Risk Calculation

All identified hazards should be subject to an evaluation for risk potential. This means analyzing the hazard for its probability to actually progress to loss event, as well as likely consequences of this event.

There are four steps to calculate risk, which determined as follows:

- 1- *Identify failure frequency (International Data Base)*
- 2- *Calculating the frequency against control measures at site by using Event Tree Analysis "ETA".*
- 3- *Identify scenarios probability.*
- 4- *Calculated risk to people regarding to the vulnerability of life loses.*

Basically, risk will be calculated as presented in the following equation:

**Risk to people (Individual Risk – IR) =**

**Total Risk ( $\Sigma$  Frequency of fire/explosion) x Occupancy x Vulnerability**

**Where:**

- |                        |   |
|------------------------|---|
| ➤ <u>Total risk</u>    | <i>Is the sum of contributions from all hazards exposed to (fire / explosion).</i>  |
| ➤ <u>Occupancy</u>     | <i>Is the proportion of time exposed to work hazards. (Expected that x man the most exposed person to fire/explosion hazards on site. He works 8 hours shift/day)</i> |
| ➤ <u>Vulnerability</u> | <i>Is the probability that exposure to the hazard will result in fatality.</i>  |

As shown in tables (5 & 6) – (Page: 33 & 34) *the vulnerability of people to heat radiation starting from 12 kW/m<sup>2</sup> will lead to fatality accident for 60 sec. Exposure and for explosion over pressure starting from 0.137 bar.*

The modeling of the different scenarios shows that the heat radiation and explosion overpressure waves would be a result from release scenarios for

Prepared By:  <b>PETROSAFE</b>	<div data-bbox="352 103 480 253"></div> <div data-bbox="791 103 919 237"></div> <div data-bbox="539 235 1171 268"><b>Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company “EGAS”</b></div>	<div data-bbox="1227 129 1442 163"><b>Page 92 of 112</b></div> <div data-bbox="1227 221 1442 250"><b>Date: Nov. 2018</b></div>
<b>Document Title: Quantitative Risk Assessment “QRA” Study For Al-Waqf Pressure Reduction &amp; Metering Station</b>		
<p>all sizes of crack and according to the space size for the PRMS, all of the sequence will be determined for three values release (small, medium and large).</p> <p>Calculating frequencies needs a very comprehensive calculations which needs a lot of data collecting related to failure of equipment’s and accident reporting with detailed investigation to know the failure frequency rates in order to calculate risks from scenarios.</p> <p>In this study, it decided that to use an International Data Bank for major hazardous incident data.</p> <p>The following table (24) show frequency for each failure can be raised in pressure reduction station operations:</p>		

***Table (24) Failure Frequency for Each Scenario***

Scenario	Release Size	Failure Cause	Failure Rate
Gas Release from 1"/4" Pipeline 1"/8" Pipeline	<i>Small</i>	Internal Corrosion	<i>1.19E-05</i>
		External Corrosion	<i>3.55E-06</i>
		Maintenance Error	<i>2.28E-05</i>
		Corrosive Liquid or Gas	<i>4.84E-04</i>
		<b>Total</b>	<b><i>5.22E-04</i></b>
Gas Release from 2"/4" Pipeline 4"/8" Pipeline	<i>Medium</i>	Internal Corrosion	<i>2.71E-05</i>
		External Corrosion	<i>8.24E-06</i>
		Erosion	<i>4.85E-04</i>
		<b>Total</b>	<b><i>5.20E-04</i></b>
Gas Release from 4"/8" Pipeline Full Rupture	<i>Large</i>	Internal Corrosion	<i>5.53E-06</i>
		External Corrosion	<i>1.61E-06</i>
		Weld Crack	<i>4.34E-06</i>
		Earthquake	<i>1.33E-07</i>
		<b>Total</b>	<b><i>1.16E-05</i></b>
Spotleak (Odorant Tank)	<i>Medium</i>	<i>As a package</i>	<b>Failure Rate</b>
		<b><i>1.25E-05</i></b>	

Reference: Taylor Associates ApS - 2006

(Hazardous Materials Release and Accident Frequencies for Process Plant - Volume II / Process Unit Release Frequencies - Version 1 Issue 7)



- **Event Tree Analysis**

An event tree is a graphical way of showing the possible outcomes of a hazardous event, such as a failure of equipment or human error.

An ETA involves determining the responses of systems and operators to the hazardous event in order to determine all possible alternative outcomes.

The result of the ETA is a series of scenarios arising from different sets of failures or errors.

These scenarios describe the possible accident outcomes in terms of the sequence of events (successes or failures of safety functions) that follow the initial hazardous event.

Event trees shall be used to identify the various escalation paths that can occur in the process. After these escalation paths are identified, the specific combinations of failures that can lead to defined outcomes can then be determined.

This allows identification of additional barriers to reduce the likelihood of such escalation.

The results of an ETA are the event tree models and the safety system successes or failures that lead to each defined outcome.

Accident sequences represents in an event tree represent logical and combinations of events; thus, these sequences can be put into the form of a fault tree model for further qualitative analysis.

These results may be used to identify design and procedural weaknesses, and normally to provide recommendations for reducing the likelihood and/or consequences of the analyzed potential accidents.

Using ETA requires knowledge of potential initiating events (that is, equipment failures or system upsets that can potentially cause an accident), and knowledge of safety system functions or emergency procedures that potentially mitigate the effects of each initiating event.

The equipment failures, system upsets and safety system functions shall be extracted from the likelihood data presented before.

In the case of hydrocarbon release, the event tree first branch is typically represents "Early Ignition". These events are represented in the risk analysis as jet fire events.

This is because sufficient time is unlikely to elapse before ignition for a gas/air mixture to accumulate and cause either a flash fire or a gas hazard.

Subsequent branches for these events represent gas detection, fire detection, inventory isolation (or ESD) or deluge activation.

Delayed ignitions are typically represented by the fifth branch event. This is because, in the time taken for an ignition to occur, sufficient time is more likely to elapse for gas detection and inventory isolation.

The scenario development shall be performed for the following cases:

- Without any control measures
- With control measures

The event tree analysis outcomes can be classified into three main categories as follows:

<b>"Limited Consequence"</b>	<i>Indicates that the release has been detected and the inventory source has been isolated automatically.</i>
<b>"Controlled Consequence"</b>	<i>Indicates that the release has been detected but the source has not been isolated automatically. [Needs human intervention].</i>
<b>"Escalated Consequence"</b>	<i>Indicates that the release has not been detected and consequently the source has not been isolated.</i>

The event trees analysis for each scenario are presented in the below pages:



Table (25) Off-take 4" / Inlet 4" / Outlet 8" Pipeline Scenarios (Pin Hole Crack – 1" Release) – Event Tree Analysis

Release of Flammable Materials <sup>(1)</sup>	Immediate Ignition <sup>(2)</sup>	Fire Detection <sup>(3)</sup>	ESD System <sup>(3)</sup>	Fire Protec. <sup>(3)</sup>	Delayed Ignition <sup>(2)</sup>	Outcomes	Frequency
5.22E-04	0.02	0.6	0.978	0.97	0.02		
5.22E-04	Yes 0.02	Yes 0.6		Yes 0.97		Controlled Jet fire	1.01E-05
				No 0.03		Not controlled jet fire	3.13E-07
		No 0.4				Escalated jet fire	4.18E-06
						Limited release	-----
	No 0.98		Yes 0.978				
				No 0.022		Large release	1.13E-05
				Yes 0.02		Escalated jet fire	1.02E-05
				No 0.98		Escalated release	5.01E-04
(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 93. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)						TOTAL	1.47E-05
(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.							
(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.							

(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 93. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)

(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.

(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.



Table (26) Off-take 4" / Inlet 4" / Outlet 8" Pipeline Scenarios (Half Rupture Release) – Event Tree Analysis

Release of Flammable Materials <sup>(1)</sup>	Immediate Ignition <sup>(2)</sup>	Fire Detection <sup>(3)</sup>	ESD System <sup>(3)</sup>	Fire Protec. <sup>(3)</sup>	Delayed Ignition <sup>(2)</sup>	Outcomes	Frequency
5.20E-04	0.02	0.6	0.978	0.97	0.02		
5.20E-04	Yes 0.02	Yes 0.6		Yes 0.97		Controlled Jet fire	1.01E-05
				No 0.03		Not controlled jet fire	3.12E-07
				No 0.4		Escalated jet fire	4.16E-06
	No 0.98	Yes 0.978			Limited release	-----	
		No 0.022			Large release	1.12E-05	
			Yes 0.02			Escalated jet fire	1.02E-05
				No 0.98		Escalated release	4.99E-04
(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 94. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)							
(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.							
(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.							
						TOTAL	1.46E-05

(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 94. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)

(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.

(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.





Table (27) Off-take 4" / Inlet 4" Pipeline Scenarios (Full Rupture Release) – Event Tree Analysis

Release of Flammable Materials <sup>(1)</sup>	Immediate Ignition <sup>(2)</sup>	Fire Detection <sup>(3)</sup>	ESD System <sup>(3)</sup>	Fire Protec. <sup>(3)</sup>	Delayed Ignition <sup>(2)</sup>	Outcomes	Frequency
1.16E-05	0.02	0.6	0.978	0.97	0.02		
1.16E-05	Yes 0.02	Yes 0.6		Yes 0.97		Controlled Jet fire	2.25E-07
				No 0.03		Not controlled jet fire	6.96E-09
		No 0.4				Escalated jet fire	9.28E-08
						Limited release	-----
	No 0.98		Yes 0.978				
			No 0.022			Large release	2.50E-07
				Yes 0.02		Escalated jet fire	2.27E-07
				No 0.98			Escalated release
(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 94. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)						TOTAL	3.27E-07
(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.							
(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.							

(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 94. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)

(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.

(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.



Table (28) Outlet 8" Pipeline Scenarios (Full Rupture Release) – Event Tree Analysis

Release of Flammable Materials <sup>(1)</sup>	Immediate Ignition <sup>(2)</sup>	Fire Detection <sup>(3)</sup>	ESD System <sup>(3)</sup>	Fire Protec. <sup>(3)</sup>	Delayed Ignition <sup>(2)</sup>	Outcomes	Frequency
1.16E-05	0.04	0.6	0.978	0.97	0.04		
1.16E-05	Yes 0.04	Yes 0.6	Yes 0.978	Yes 0.97		Controlled Jet fire	4.50E-07
		No 0.4		No 0.03		Not controlled jet fire	1.39E-08
	No 0.96	Yes 0.6	Yes 0.978	Yes 0.97		Escalated jet fire	1.86E-07
						Limited release	-----
		No 0.4	No 0.022	Yes 0.04		Large release	2.45E-07
						Escalated jet fire	4.45E-07
				No 0.96		Escalated release	1.07E-05
TOTAL							6.45E-07

(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 94. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)

(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.

(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.



Table (29) Odorant Tank Release – Event Tree Analysis

Release of Flammable Materials <sup>(1)</sup>	Immediate Ignition <sup>(2)</sup>	Fire Detection <sup>(3)</sup>	ESD System <sup>(3)</sup>	Fire Protec. <sup>(3)</sup>	Delayed Ignition <sup>(2)</sup>	Outcomes	Frequency
1.25E-05	0.2	0.6	0.978	0.97	0.065		
1.25E-05	Yes 0.2	Yes 0.6		Yes 0.97		Controlled fire	2.43E-06
				No 0.03		Large fire	7.50E-08
				No 0.4		Escalated fire	1.00E-06
	No 0.8		Yes 0.978		Limited leak	-----	
			No 0.022		Large leak	2.20E-07	
				Yes 0.065		Escalated fire	6.50E-07
				No 0.935		Escalated leak	9.35E-06
(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 94. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)						TOTAL	1.13E-05
(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.							
(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.							

(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 94. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)

(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.

(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.

The following table (30) show the total frequency for each scenario from ETA - Tables (25 to 29):

**Table (30) Total Frequencies for Each Scenario**

Source of Release	Total Frequency (ETA)
1" / 4" Off-Take Pipeline Pin Hole	<b>1.47E-05</b>
1" / 4" Inlet Pipeline Pin Hole	
1" / 8" Outlet Pipeline Pin Hole	
2" / 4" Off-Take Pipeline Half Rupture	<b>1.46E-05</b>
2" / 4" Inlet Pipeline Half Rupture	
4" / 8" Outlet Pipeline Half Rupture	
4" Off-Take Pipeline Full Rupture	<b>3.27E-07</b>
4" Inlet Pipeline Full Rupture	
8" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture	<b>6.45E-07</b>
Odorant Tank 1" hole Leak	<b>1.13E-05</b>

The following table (31) summarize the risk events on workers / public:

**Table No. (31) Summarize the Risk on Workers / Public (Occupancy)**

<b>Off-take 4" Pipeline Release Scenarios</b>					
	Event Exposure	Jet / Pool Fire (12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> )		Explosion Overpressure (0.137 bar)	
		Workers	Public	Workers	Public
Pin Hole	1"	None	None	None	None
Half Rupture	2"	None	None	None	None
Full Rupture	4"	None	5 for 5 sec.(0.02)	None	None
<b>Inlet 4" Pipeline Release Scenarios</b>					
Pin Hole	1"	None	None	None	None
Half Rupture	2"	None	None	2 for 24 h. (2)	None
Full Rupture	4"	2 for 24 h. (2)	None	None	5 for 12 h. (2.5)
<b>Outlet 8" Pipeline Release Scenarios</b>					
Pin Hole	1"	None	None	None	None
Half Rupture	4"	2 for 24 h. (2)	None	2 for 24 h. (2)	None
Full Rupture	8"	2 for 24 h. (2)	None	None	None
<b>Odorant Tank Release Scenario</b>					
Small Leak	1"	None	None	2 for 24 h. (2)	None

Therefore, the risk calculation will depend on total risk from these scenarios, and as per the equation page (91):

**Risk to People (Individual Risk – IR) =**

**Total Risk ( $\Sigma$  Frequency of fire/explosion) x Occupancy x Vulnerability**

**Where:**

- Total risk - is the sum of contributions from all hazards exposed to (fire / explosion).

**(Frequencies of Scenarios from Table-30)**

- Occupancy - is the proportion of time exposed to work hazards. (Expected that X man the most exposed person to fire/explosion hazards on site. He works 8 hours "shift/day").

**(As per client data, AlWaqf PRMS occupancy is 4 persons / 24 hours)**

**(As per site visit to PRMS, the most exposed are 5 persons for 12 hours "the nearest public house", for the Off-take 2 persons for 5 sec. "sub-way" "Table 31")**

- Vulnerability - is the probability that exposure to the hazard will result in fatality.

**(Reference: Report No./DNV Reg. No.: 2013-4091/1/17 TLT 29-6 – Rev. 1)**

As per modeling, the IR will be calculated for the workers and the public around the PRMS and Off-Take Point (public buildings or whom passing on front of) as per the following tables (32, 33 & 34):

**Table (32) Individual Risk (IR) Calculation for the Off-Take Public**

Source of Event	Frequency <b>1</b>	Heat Radiation kW/m <sup>2</sup> & Overpressure	Vulnerability <b>2</b>	Time Exposed <b>3</b>	IR = <b>1 x 2 x 3</b>
Gas Release from 8" off-take point	3.27E-07	Jet Fire 12.5	0.7 (Outdoor)	0.02 <sup>2 Pers.</sup>	<b>4.58E-09</b>
<b>TOTAL Risk for the Public (Off-Take)</b>					<b>4.58E-09</b>




**Table (33) Individual Risk (IR) Calculation for the PRMS Workers**

Source of Event	Frequency 1	Heat Radiation kW/m <sup>2</sup> & Overpressure	Vulnerability 2	Time Exposed 3	IR = 1 x 2 x 3
Gas Release from 2"/4" inlet pipeline	1.46E-05	Explosion 0.137	0.3 (Indoor)	2 <sup>2</sup> Pers.	<b>8.76E-06</b>
Gas Release from 4" inlet pipeline	3.27E-07	Jet Fire 12.5	0.1 (Indoor)	2 <sup>2</sup> Pers.	<b>6.54E-08</b>
Gas Release from 4"/8" outlet pipeline	1.46E-05	Jet Fire 12.5	0.1 (Indoor)	2 <sup>2</sup> Pers.	<b>2.92E-06</b>
		Explosion 0.137	0.3 (Indoor)	2 <sup>2</sup> Pers.	<b>8.76E-06</b>
Gas Release from 8" outlet pipeline	6.45E-07	Jet Fire 12.5	0.1 (Indoor)	2 <sup>2</sup> Pers.	<b>1.29E-07</b>
Odorant tank 1" leak	1.13E-05	Explosion 0.137	0.3 (Indoor)	2 <sup>2</sup> Pers.	<b>6.78E-06</b>
<b>TOTAL Risk for the Workers</b>					<b>2.74E-05</b>

**Table (34) Individual Risk (IR) Calculation for the Public Near to the PRMS**

Source of Event	Frequency 1	Heat Radiation kW/m <sup>2</sup> & Overpressure	Vulnerability 2	Time Exposed 3	IR = 1 x 2 x 3
Gas release from 4" inlet pipeline	3.27E-07	Explosion 0.137	0.3 (Indoor)	2.5 <sup>5</sup> Pers.	<b>2.45E-07</b>
<b>TOTAL Risk for the Public (PRMS)</b>					<b>2.45E-07</b>



## Summary of Modeling Results and Conclusion

As per results from modeling the consequences of each scenario, the following table summarize the study, and as follows:

Event	Scenario	Effects
<b>Pin hole (1") gas release 4" inlet pipeline</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 4 &amp; 9.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> will be limited inside the PRMS boundary. The values of 12.5, 25 &amp; 37,5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> not determined by the software due to small amount of the gas released.</i>
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
<b>Half Rupture (2") gas release 4" inlet pipeline</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud (50 % LFL) will extend to be near to the admin office downwind.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<i>The modeling shows that the values of 9.5 &amp; 12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> will effects the firefighting facilities crosswind northeast side.</i>
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will cover the admin room (downwind) and firefighting facility (crosswind) and extend outside the PRMS boundary from the east and west sides not reaching surrounds. The values of 0.137 and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and near to the admin office and firefighting facilities.</i>

Event	Scenario	Effects
<b>Full Rupture gas release 4" inlet pipeline</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects (LFL &amp; 50 % LFL) will extend to reach the admin office and over SE boundary reaching a distance of about 13 m from the east fence downwind near to the public building boundary.  The UFL and LFL will reach the admin office downwind.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values 9.5, 12.5 &amp; 25 kW/m<sup>2</sup> will cover the admin office downwind and firefighting facilities crosswind, and with some extension (9.5 &amp; 12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup>) outside with no effects.</i>
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020, 0.137 &amp; 0.206 bar will extend outside the PRMS boundary from southeast side covering the public house and the external road, with no effects inside the PRMS (0.137 &amp; 0.206 bar).</i>
	Heat radiation / Fireball 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	N/D
<b>Pin hole (1") gas release 8" outlet pipeline</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud will be limited inside the PRMS boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation value 1.6, 4 &amp; 9.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary downwind with no effects of 12.5, 25 &amp; 37.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup>, which not determined by the software.</i>

Event	Scenario	Effects
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<p>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will cover the PRMS components and extend outside the boundary from all sides near to the public houses (down and crosswind).</p> <p>The values of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS boundary affecting the PRMS facilities and reaching the firefighting facilities crosswind.</p>
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D

#### **Half Rupture (4") gas release 8" outlet pipeline**

	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<p>The modeling shows that the gas cloud (UFL, LFL &amp; 50% LFL) will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and will be near to the admin office.</p>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<p>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 &amp; 37.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> will be limited inside the PRMS boundary affecting the admin office.</p>
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<p>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will cover the PRMS components and extend outside the boundary from all sides near to the public houses (down and crosswind).</p> <p>The values of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS boundary affecting the PRMS facilities and reaching the firefighting facilities crosswind.</p>
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<p>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend PRMS boundary covering the PRMS components inside and outside from southeast side reaching the public building.</p> <p>The value of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS extend to the southeast behind the admin office.</p>



Event	Scenario	Effects
<b>Full Rupture gas release 8" outlet pipeline</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and near to the admin office downwind.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<i>The modeling shows that all radiation values will affects the admin office and extend outside the PRMS from southeast side near to the public building (9 &amp; 12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup>) downwind.</i>
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will cover the PRMS components and extend outside the boundary from all sides near to the public houses (down and crosswind). The values of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS boundary affecting the PRMS facilities and reaching the firefighting facilities crosswind.</i>
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend PRMS boundary covering the PRMS components inside and outside from southeast side reaching the public building. The value of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will extend outside the PRMS from the southeast side with no effects on the public building downwind.</i>
	Heat radiation / Fireball 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 9.5 &amp; 12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and near to the firefighting facilities crosswind.</i>
<b>Odorant tank 1" leak</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the vapor cloud will be limited inside the PRMS boundary reaching the admin office downwind. Consideration should be taken when deal with liquid, vapors and smokes according to the MSDS for the material.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation will be limited inside the PRMS boundary with some extension outside from southwest side with no effects.</i>

Event	Scenario	Effects
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that all values will be limited inside the PRMS boundary effecting the admin office downwind.</i>
<b>Pin hole (1") gas release 4" off-take pipeline</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the off-take boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 1.6 kW/m<sup>2</sup> will be limited inside the off-take boundary with some extension outside downwind with no effects.</i> <i>The values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 &amp; 37.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> not determined by the software as it is very small values.</i>
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
<b>Half Rupture (2") gas release 4" off-take pipeline</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the off-take boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 1.6 will extend outside the off-take boundary from south, east and west sides with a few meters.</i> <i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of &amp; 4 kW/m<sup>2</sup> will extend outside the off-take boundary downwind with no effects.</i> <i>The values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 &amp; 37.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup> not determined by the software as it is very small values.</i>

Event	Scenario	Effects
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
<b>Full Rupture gas release 4" off-take pipeline</b>		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud will be limited inside the off-take boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values will extend outside the off-take boundary from southeast side downwind with about 50 m covering the outside subway.</i>
	Early explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
	Late explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
	Heat radiation / Fireball 9.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup> 12.5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	N/D

The previous table shows that there are some of potential hazards with heat radiation (12.5 kW/m<sup>2</sup>) resulting from jet fire and explosion overpressure waves (0.137 bar) from late explosion events (Described in table 31).


These risks (Jet fire & Explosion overpressure waves) will affects the workers at the PRMS, and reach the public around the station (public building). In addition, it was noted that there is some effects from off-take point on surrounding area (public road) from heat radiation effects.

Regarding to risk calculations; the risk to **Workers found in Low ALARP, the Public (PRMS) and Off-Take in Acceptable Region**, so there are some points need to be considered to keep the risk tolerability and this will be describe in the study recommendations.


## Recommendations

It is noted through the calculation of the risk rates that the probabilities are within the ALARP region for the PRMS workers and acceptable region to the public near to PRMS, and to keep the risk as found, it is recommended that:

- From the side view of safety (prevention from heat radiation and explosion overpressure waves) and based on consequence modeling results of the different scenarios the site components distribution (admin office and firefighting facilities) needs to be rearranged as follows: (considering standard spacing)



- Ensure that all facility specifications referred to the national and international codes and standards.
- Ensure that the inspection and maintenance plans and programs are according to the manufacturers guidelines to keep all facility parts in a good condition.
- Ensure that all operation is according to standard operating procedure for the PRMS operations and training programs in-place for operators.
- Review and update the emergency response plan to include the main detailed elements for ERP and all scenarios in this study and other needs including:
  - Firefighting brigades, mutual aids, emergency communications and fire detection / protection systems.
  - First aid including dealing with the odorant according to the MSDS for it, with respect of means of water supply for emergency showers, eye washers and cleaning.

Prepared By:  <b>PETROSAFE</b>	 <b>Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company “EGAS”</b>	Page 112 of 112  <b>Date: Nov. 2018</b>
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Safe routs and exits for the control room and security office according to the modeling in this study.</li> <li>- Ensure that emergency shutdown detailed procedure including emergency gas isolation points at the PRMS and valves room in place.</li> <li>- Ensure that the surface drainage system is suitable for containment any odorant spills.</li> <li>- Considering that all electrical equipment, facilities and connections are according to the hazardous area classification for natural gas facilities.</li> <li>- Provide the site with SCBA “Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus” (at least two sets) and arrange training programs for operators.</li> <li>- Provide a suitable tool for wind direction (Windsock) to be installed in a suitable place to determine the wind direction.</li> <li>- Cooperation should be done with the concerned parties before planning for housing projects around the PRMS area.</li> </ul>		